PRIME NEWS POST
The INDONESIAN (Jakarta)— The death of Bambang Setiyawan is a human tragedy and a criminal case that must be thoroughly investigated. However, it cannot be taken as direct evidence that the reform of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) has failed. Such a conclusion exceeds available facts, conflates the responsibility of perpetrators with that of authorities, and turns an ongoing investigation into a verdict against an entire institutional reform process.
Bambang is alleged to have died after being assaulted by a group of people during the unrest in Pejompongan on August 27, 2026. Until the identities of perpetrators, the sequence of violence, motives, relationships between those involved, and possible masterminds are revealed, there is no factual basis to claim Bambang’s death resulted from actions, orders, or operational design by Polri.
Bambang’s death is legally and causally distinct from the death of Affan Kurniawan. Affan died after being struck by a Brimob tactical vehicle—the vehicle, personnel, and institution involved could be directly identified. Bambang allegedly died due to violence by non-authorities amid unrest. Linking the two solely because they occurred in nearby areas on nearly the same date is symbolic reasoning, not proof of shared responsibility. Proximity of location does not mean shared perpetrators; closeness in time does not prove repeated failures; and being an uninvolved civilian does not alter the legal structure of each event.
Narratives claiming Affan died due to police action while Bambang died because police failed to protect him essentially position Polri as always at fault. When police use force, they are accused of repression; when others commit violence in an incompletely controlled situation, they are again accused of failure. Polri’s duty to protect the public is not a guarantee that every crime can be prevented. The state does not automatically become the perpetrator whenever an offense occurs within a secured area.
To establish institutional negligence, one must prove authorities knew of a concrete threat to Bambang, had a clear opportunity to intervene, effectively controlled the location, yet willfully or negligently failed to act—no such evidence has been presented. Claims that police “saved the DPR complex by diverting unrest toward Pejompongan” also lack sufficient basis. This would require proof through command orders, deployment maps, communication logs, dispersal timelines, crowd movement patterns, exit conditions, and CCTV records. The movement of crowds from the DPR to Pejompongan does not automatically prove it was engineered by police.
Available reports indicate the main demonstration had already dispersed before groups of rioters arrived or remained on-site. These groups set fire to facilities, blocked roads, threw objects at authorities, and carried dangerous items—police confiscated machetes, iron chains, slingshots, sticks, and 19 arrows. This evidence shows officers faced organized violence with real destructive capacity, not merely peaceful demonstrators expressing aspirations. In such circumstances, repelling groups attacking authorities and damaging facilities cannot simply be labeled failure. Allowing unrest to persist before the parliament building was also not a neutral option—the complex is not an inanimate object; people, state facilities, transport routes, and government functions inside and around it required protection.
Police reform does not mean losing authority to use force—it requires that force be applied lawfully, for legitimate purposes, in measured stages, under command oversight, and with accountability. A reformed police force remains duty-bound to stop arson, destruction, armed assaults, and mob violence.
Security operations on August 27 actually revealed important differences compared to 2025: personnel were directed to prioritize persuasion, were not equipped with firearms or edged weapons, security was divided into zones, and medical teams plus hospital referral systems were prepared. When Bambang was found unconscious, the Polda Metro Jaya Medical Team evacuated him once conditions permitted. Delayed evacuation cannot be instantly interpreted as abandonment—medical teams cannot enter active violence zones without protection without risking more lives. Securing an evacuation corridor is part of rescue, not a pretext for delay.
Polda Metro Jaya also met with the family and offered an autopsy to determine the cause of death, which the family declined. That decision must be respected, but refusal limits investigators’ ability to obtain medical evidence on injury patterns, weapons used, time of death, and the causal link between violence and death. Accordingly, the absence of a specific suspect just days after the incident does not prove neglect. Investigators must review footage, identify individuals, match clothing and vehicles, trace communications, interview witnesses, analyze forensic evidence, and separate assailants from hundreds of people present.
While the 48 suspects in the unrest must not be used to deflect attention from Bambang’s death, separating the cases also shows Polri is not hastily designating people as killers without sufficient evidence. Law enforcement must not be pressured into naming suspects prematurely merely to satisfy public demands.
Judging reform failure based on this single death is also premature in timeline terms: the ten reform recommendations were submitted to the President on May 5, 2026; Law No. 5 of 2026 took effect June 17, 2026; and implementation is targeted through 2029. Bambang died 71 days after the law’s enactment—enough time to assess initial responsiveness, but far too soon to judge an entire reform spanning regulation, organization, training, oversight, technology, procedures, and institutional culture. Reform cannot be measured by the absence or presence of casualties in one event; it is measured by whether the institution operates with greater restraint, transparency, professionalism, and willingness to correct errors.
The presence of civilian groups near the unrest also cannot be attributed to Polri. An organization’s acknowledgment that members assisted security efforts does not prove official request, assignment, coordination, or control. Unilateral claims do not establish command relationships. Polri must clarify whether coordination existed—if not, those groups bear full responsibility for their actions; if yes, the scope and chain of oversight must be disclosed. Should any civilian group member be found involved in Bambang’s assault, Polri must prosecute them without regard to affiliation or political ties.
Bambang’s death is therefore better described as a test of reform’s consistency—not proof of its failure. That test will be defined by investigators’ success in identifying perpetrators, masterminds, and those who gave orders; Polri’s transparency in explaining security operations; and the institution’s willingness to improve protection for residential areas along protest routes. Reform does not fail simply because crime still occurs. It fails only if authorities know the truth but conceal it, possess evidence but hide it, discover operational errors but refuse to fix them, or let a death go unresolved without justice.
Affan’s death taught that police use of force must be limited and supervised. Bambang’s death reminds that authorities still need lawful force to stop violence by others. Genuine reform does not render police passive in the face of rioters—it ensures state power is used legally, proportionately, and to protect citizens. Bambang’s killing is a crime that must be solved. Using it to pronounce reform dead before the full facts are known only obscures accountability for those who attacked and killed him.
Reported from various media sources //photo from Google documents // contribution by Prime News Post international online media // news.paper
